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Abstract 
In this paper we study whether the progressive liberalization of the U.S. telecommunica- 
tions industry has altered the psychology of firms’ behavior and led to performance changes. 
A detailed theoretical framework is developed, based on extension of the postulates of 
x-efficiency theory. Such an extension of x-efficiency theory enables us to make predictions 
regarding the direction of performance changes and whether among the various measures of 
performance there are likely to be cross-sectional differences, even as these different 
measures change over time. Two performance measures are computed. The first measures 
the ability of firms to maximize revenues, given their resources; the second measures their 
ability to reduce costs given the level of outputs generated. We find that market liberaliza- 
tion has significantly impacted the internal psychology within firms, in encouraging both 
entrepreneurially-oriented and productivity-oriented behavior. However, over time as the 
market gets more and more liberalized it is the entrepreneurially-oriented behavior that is 
dominant. We also examine whether ownership differences cause divergences among the 
firms studied in behavior and performance. We find that erstwhile AT&T-owned firms are 
always superior to independents in revenue-maximizing skills, but in an era of monopoly 
were not cost minimizers. In a liberalized environment their cost minimization skills are also 
superior to the independent firms. 
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1. I~t~d~etion 
Points of view exist that suggest market liberalization in many industries 
is impossible, with such premises resting on the belief that there are 
benefits to horizontal and vertical control of industries. It is assumed that 
the level of scale and scope economies are such as to preclude competition, 
since new firm entry will often lead to wasteful resource duplication 
(Baumol et al., 1982). The above views are driven by technological inter-de- 
pendency considerations, but the existence of managerial efficiencies does 
not necessarily follow as a result (Shepherd, 1983). However, significant 
technological changes are also occurring in many industrial sectors. The 
first-order consequences of these are changes in public policy, allowing the 
liberalization of markets. A second-order psychological effect is the impact 
such policy changes have at the micro-micro level on firms within the 
liberalized industry. Increasing liberalization of an industry is a means 
toward eliminating inefficiencies in general (Comanor and Leibenstein, 
1969); it is also a means of stimulating innovativeness and motivating firms 
to fully exploit economic opportunities that may be present in their 
economic environments (Leibenstein, 1976). 
In this paper we examine whether the increasing liberalization of the 
US. telecommunications industry environment, consequent upon the tech- 
nological and institutional changes that have taken place, has indeed led 
firms to improve their micro-micro performance. A powerful set of postu- 
lates for explaining such performance changes exists in x-efficiency theory, 
and we use these postulates in developing a theoretical framework to 
explain intra-firm psychological changes arising from market liberalization. 
Such changes lead to subsequent performance changes in firms, and we 
then illustrate performance changes of individua1 firms comprising the U.S. 
telecommunications industry for a fifteen-year period: 1973 to 1987. This 
paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we develop our theoretical 
framework. In Section 3 we describe the empirical research design; this 
section includes a discussion of the telecommunications industry and the 
application of data envelopment analysis (DEA) to measure performance. 
In Section 4 we analyze the initiai results. Section 5 contains an analysis of 
results by ownership category. The U.S. telecommunications industry is 
unique in that there have been several private entities which have operated 
telephone services in the U.S.A, unlike in other countries where one 
state-owned monopoly has always dominated; interesting psychological 
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issues emerge as a result of divergent ownership patterns. Section 6 
includes a concluding summary. 
2. The theoretical framework 
2.1. Introduction 
The fact that a liberal market environment is a spur for firms to be 
efficient and innovative is very well recognized. Adam Smith (1776/1937) 
postulated that the superiority of the market as a vehicle for economic 
coordination reacted largely on its mobilization of incentives; the market 
tapped the psychology of individual self-interest in a way that no single 
organization could hope to. Subsequently, Hayek (1945) developed the view 
that the market, by economizing on information, minimized the enormous 
costs of collecting and transmitting information that beset a central body 
planning the operations of a large system. 
Nevertheless, these views only reflect the exchange dimension, wherein 
transformed goods are allocated according to demand by a coordination 
process, so that value can be determined (McNulty, 1968). Yet there is a 
second institution, the firm, which, with the aid of resources, determines 
physical form and the transformation of goods. The mechanisms which 
induce it to become efficient and innovative are often treated as if they 
belong in a “black box”. Hence, as Leibenstein (1987, p. 62) writes: 
“nowadays we would see at least one deficiency in the market solution: No 
connection is made between the ownership of resources and the motivation 
that would result. In other words, the coordination problem is divorced 
from the motivation problem.” 
How can we integrate notions of coordination and motivation so that we 
fully understand the linkages between exchange and transformation? X-ef- 
ficiency theory offers us this possibility. The basic notion that underlies 
traditional, or neo-classical notions of economic behavior is that sub-opti- 
mal operations are not possible by firms. X-efficiency theory assumes 
otherwise. Its originator, Harvey Leibenstein, articulates how because of a 
lack of incentives or imperfect information arising from being sheltered 
from competition, there is no presumption that functional units within a 
firm, to which resources are allocated, will use the resources at hand most 
efficiently; the difference between the maximal efficiency and actual effi- 
ciency of resource utilization is the degree of x-inefficiency (Leibenstein, 
1976). 
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X-efficiency theory explicitly counts motivation of individuals as part of 
the input into productive activity, and such motivation is influenced by the 
amount of utility obtained from work situations (Dovring, 1979). When 
there is shelter from competition, pressures on individuals to be cost 
conscious are not forthcoming; costs, after all, can be passed on to 
consumers. Concomitantly, the price signals transmitted throughout the 
process of market-place operations are also lacking; thus, intra-firm signals 
to be entrepreneurial or pro-active in business generation are also absent. 
Hence, there is a lack of constraints on the behavior of individuals within 
the firm to exert themselves to their fullest. A perception that such 
exertions may lead to greater utilities from the work situation is lacking and 
results in “an outright lack of cost consciousness by some, and among 
others who may have a general desire to economize a neglect of the details 
necessary to minimize costs and maximize productivity” (Babilot et al., 
1987, p. 206). 
We take the position that x-inefficiency in firms arises primarily because 
of individuals’ unwillingness to exert themselves to the fullest and maximize 
their opportunity sets. Thus, resource utilization within the firm suffers. 
Some causes of non-maximization have been recently listed by Shen (1991) 
as distraction, imperfect design and operation of workplaces, low aspiration 
and bounded rationality. These cause the x-inefficiencies that lead to a 
reduction in the potential output of firms, which is our unit of analysis. 
Also, some writing has suggested that on-the-job consumption is an in- 
stance of maximizing rational behavior at an individual level, and is 
“efficient” (Stigler, 1976). We reiterate that our unit of analysis is the firm. 
Therefore, to the extent that such consumption leads to the diversion of 
resources away from the firm’s output, x-inefficiency is manifested at the 
level of the firm. Nevertheless, even such individual consumption may not 
be optimally undertaken for the reasons Shen (1991) posits. Because firms 
are not homogenous entities, but possess idiosyncratic and heterogeneous 
resources, skills and capabilities (Nelson, 19911, the way these resources 
are configured into packages of unique skills and capabilities also differ. 
Hence, there can be significant variations within firms in their levels of 
x-inefficiencies. 
2.2, Behavioral issues 
How does the psychological model operate? The key variables in the 
theory are pressure and effort, and three aspects of pressure exist. First, 
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there is the external pressure in the environment including the market. 
Second, there is internal pressure as translated from the outside to the 
inside of the firm. Third, there is the internal response to translated 
pressure, which is effort oriented towards various dimensions of perfor- 
mance. For example, managers may perceive that new product introduc- 
tions have to be made in an environment where customers have greater 
choices; such product-introduction pressures are translated into specific 
work practice changes, such as structural reorganization, within the firm. 
To these pressures from management, who are often themselves reacting to 
endogenous forces, individuals can react in various ways. First, there can be 
efforts to assume more on-job responsibilities, if past unwillingness to do so 
or rigidities in job assignments have existed; second, there can be intra-firm 
entrepreneurial or business development activities undertaken to create 
new repertoires of activities for the organization. 
The key variable is effort, and internal pressures determine intra-firm 
effort levels of two kinds. The first is discretionary effort, positive in 
nature, to be innovative and not procedure bound, or “work according to 
rule”. Such effort may depend on the achievement motivations, as de- 
scribed by McClelland and Winter (19691, of individuals who may take a 
stronger than average interest in revenue-cost relationships when they 
discern economic opportunities that are emergent. Since effort is a func- 
tion of human will, the lack of opportunities in the economic environment 
acts as a brake on the natural propensities of human beings to better their 
lot, and thus build up human capital. Such abilities lie latent, with a 
consequent impact on intra-firm performance, because of the lack of 
possible rewards. 
The second type is effort to reduce inertial behavior which may be 
engendering sub-optimal decisions. Inertia is a ubiquitous human and 
social phenomenon; boundaries of the cognitive range of individuals exist, 
within which intra-firm and external signals are read, yet no behavioral 
changes may occur as a result because of the forces of inertia (Tanner and 
Swets, 1954). Such forces of inertia, and the width of these cognitive 
boundaries, determine behavior and thus changes in overall performance 
of the firm. When boundaries within which inertia exists get narrower and 
more compressed as a result of internal pressures, then rapid changes in 
such performance may be expected as a result of efforts to reduce inertia. 
Effort, therefore, is of two kinds within the constructs of x-efficiency 
theory, and each has a role in determining overall performance. 
Competition, arising from the market liberalization, enables market 
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differentiation to occur where premium prices may be sustainable. At a 
macro or aggregative level the presence of more firms can generate supply 
of goods greater than in a monopoly regime. Such supply factors also 
generate demand which is qualitatively and quantitatively superior to 
demand patterns seen in a monopoly regime. Given the increasing pool of 
information that develops as a result of competition intensification (Mc- 
Cain, 19751, an internal market for ideas to undertake new activities, so as 
to fill niches and recover premium prices, can develop within the firm and 
be used to create motivational incentives. Such motivational incentives, and 
the availability of opportunities, spur the supply of effort towards en- 
trepreneurial acts, as firm members see themselves performing tasks not 
done by others. Resulting from the release of latent entrepreneurial spirits, 
rising individual effort is expended towards creating new revenue streams, 
so that employees can also then share in the gains brought about by 
external market shifts (Leibenstein, 1987). Hence, a firm-level phenomenon 
that we predict will happen is an increase in its ability to generate 
revenues. 
Emerging pressures from a liberalized and competitive environment 
create price pressures, and to remain profitable when prices start declining 
costs have to reduce. According to Leibenstein (1976, p. 207): “The quest 
for such lower costs transmits itself to individuals, at various levels within 
the firm, whose sense of success requires that the firm stays profitable or at 
least solvent, and of whom it is believed, or who themselves believe, that 
they can influence costs.” Since operational employees make up the largest 
proportion of employees in any firm, such signals have wide diffusion and 
impact; thus another result of the process of firm-level behavioral changes 
that we predict is an improving trend in resource utilization and cost 
minimization, as the environment becomes more competitive. 
Based on ideas from x-efficiency theory, Hoenack (1989) posits another 
argument. Firm-level reward systems are often geared towards those who 
help enhance revenues, rather than towards those who save costs. Thus, 
greater personal rewards often accrue if one contributes to the increased 
revenues of a firm, and individual and group efforts are likely to be 
directed towards activities which create personal revenue-oriented “rent” 
streams. Arising from increasing opportunities, most intra-firm visibility 
can thus be acquired through entrepreneurial and revenue-enhancing ac- 
tions; hence individual predilections converge toward creating revenue 
streams and a prediction from the theoretical framework is that firms will 
be relatively more x-efficient in their ability to maximize revenues relative 
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to their ability to minimize costs. While firms may be relatively more 
x-efficient in maximizing revenues relative to minimizing costs, because 
reward systems constrain cost-efficiency seeking behavior, nevertheless, the 
absolute quantum of both revenue maximization and cost minimization 
x-efficiencies increase, as liberalization provides market opportunities, and 
pressures to perform efficiently develop. 
3. Empirical study 
3.1. The telecommunications industry: Description and choice of sector 
We evaluate the dynamics of x-efficiency arising out of market liberaliza- 
tion in a major sector of the U.S. telecommunications industry. While 
AT&T was the dominant monopoly supplier, it was comprised of 22 
separate, semi-independent, operating companies which since the 1984 
divestiture have become part of seven regional holding companies (RHCS). 
Other operating companies include those belonging to several diverse 
groups such as GTE, United, Continental and Central telephone systems, 
as well as Bell-related independents such as Cincinnati Bell, Rochester 
Telephone and Southern New England Telephone. These non-Bell (non- 
RHC after 1984) companies provide telephone services over 60 percent of 
the land area of the United States. While they have not enjoyed near-equal 
monopoly status as many of the AT&T companies did, they have been 
suppliers of services in many cities such as Cincinnati and Rochester, and 
have been the key supplier in much of rural or suburban U.S.A. Together 
these operating firms account for over two-thirds of all telephone activities 
in the United States, and their total revenue estimates for 1987 were at 
least $70 billion. 
Studies (Langdale, 1983; Meyer et al., 1980) show that business cus- 
tomers, while accounting for a relatively low proportion among total 
customer numbers, account for the most significant revenue components of 
operating companies. These customers are also the ones most susceptible 
to bypass. Bypass, defined by Weisman (1988) as a direct connection 
between a customer’s premises and another carrier (service bypass) or a 
self-contained system that avoids services provided by any carrier (facility 
bypass), is the most direct competitive threat to operating companies. 
Where the costs of the bypass supplier are lower than those of operating 
companies, then bypass is economically justifiable and operating companies 
will be forced to be more efficient to compete. Since the late 1970s 
technology and institutional frameworks have permitted bypass of local 
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operating company systems to occur steadily (Bolter et al., 1990). Simulta- 
neously, these conditions allow scope to existing operating companies to be 
innovative, and enhance their revenue streams, because greater technology 
and market choices are available. 
Given the preceding industry scenario, we evaluate the performance of 
the 40 key operating firms, of which 22 (or 55 percent) are the erstwhile 
AT&T Bell Operating Companies (BOCs) and 18 (or 45 percent) are other 
independent companies, in the U.S. telecommunications industry. This is 
almost the entire population of the key firms making up the industry 
sector. Possession of empirically-derived data on these two groups of firms 
will also provide evidence on whether indeed ownership factors are mate- 
rial in x-inefficiency generation. Ownership differences are a key explana- 
tor in x-efficiency theory (Shelton, 1967). Within this population there are 
two groups of firms: AT&T (RHC) and non-AT&T (RHC) firms, or the 
independents, and each group is likely to possess distinctly different 
behavioral norms arising from the way industry structure evolved in the 
early 20th century. 
We evaluate changes in x-efficiencies for five time-periods: 1973, 1978, 
1981, 1984, and 1987. 1973 is chosen as the starting point because till then 
there was no effective competition in the industry. “Events” were occurring 
around then, and by 1978 their lagged impact would be felt. Between 1978 
and 1981 technology-driven product-competition evolved faster than any- 
time ever. No significant deregulatory moves such as the divestiture took 
place. However, two significant events that occurred were the 1978 Execu- 
tive decision which allowed price competition to enter into long-distance 
markets, and the 1981 Computer Inquiry I decision which allowed existing 
firms to provide value-added network services as a competitive response to 
other smaller players who could do so. The period 1981 to 1984 was one of 
transition. With the recognition of technological convergence in the indus- 
try, the critical competition-enhancing public policy events were taking 
place, and changes in the industry market structure were expected to have 
a significant impact on firm-level outcomes. The last phase, 1984 to 1987, 
was one of consolidation. After the turbulence of the late 1970s and the 
early 1980s the environment was such that competition was conceptualized 
as the norm, rather than the exception. 
3.2. The data envelopment analysis (DEA) models estimated 
In this sub-section we describe the technique that we use to measure 
whether the relative ability of operating companies in the telecommunica- 
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tions industry to generate more revenues with the resources at hand, or 
minimize costs given output levels attained, is increasing or not. Such an 
approach is predicated by the fact that in the theory of the firm a 
transformation function describes a firm’s underlying operations, where 
maximum output for given levels of other outputs and inputs, or the 
minimum input required for producing given outputs, with other inputs 
also given, can be specified. Correspondingly, other functions are: a cost 
function describing the minimum cost of producing certain outputs, with 
given inputs, prices and technology; a revenue function describing the 
maximum revenue obtainable given inputs, outputs, prices and technology; 
and a profit function describing the maximum profit with given output and 
input prices and technology. 
A common characteristic of each function described above is optimality, 
whereby a maximum or minimum value achievable, given prices and/or 
technology, is calculated and each function defines a frontier. The use of 
frontier models is very relevant. First, the notion of a frontier defines what 
performance level can be feasibly obtained by firms. Second, deviations 
from a frontier can be naturally interpreted as a manifestation of x-inef- 
ficiency. Third, information about the frontier, and the distance of each 
firm from the frontier, yields significant policy insights as to what is the 
rate and direction of change in firm x-efficiency. See Button and Weyman- 
Jones (19921, Leibenstein and Maital (1992) and Majumdar (1994) for 
applications of DEA in the measurement of x-inefficiencies. 
We use a non-parametric approach, called data envelopment analysis 
(DEA), to construct frontiers and calculate the associated performance 
indices of 40 operating firms in the U.S. telecommunications industry for 
five time-periods: 1973, 1978, 1981, 1984, and 1987. As developed by 
Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes [CCR] (19781, a generalized multiple out- 
put-input measure of performance is developed by means of the following 
fractional mathematical program, where the ratio of the weighted outputs 
to weighted inputs for each firm being evaluated is maximized, subject to 
the constraint that this ratio is less than or equal to the performance of all 
other observations in the data set and the maximum performance score can 
be 1. The general form of the program is: 
k% 
Objective: Max h, = ‘ill’ , (1) 
i=l 
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subject to the constraints: 
(a) Less than unity: 
i=l 
(b) Positiuity: 
u,> 0, (r= l,...,S) 
y>O, (i=l,..., m). (3) 
The data used for each firm j, (j = 1, 2,. . . ,O, . . . ,200) are the Y,. outputs 
and Xii inputs and the U, and V;: weights are determined objectively from 
the data. The DEA algorithm calculates an ex-post evaluation of how 
efficient each firm was with regard to either output maximization or input 
minimization without making any assumption about either technology or 
functional form. Optimization is performed N times, computing an optimal 
set of weights Ur*, y* > 0 and efficiency measures h*, for each 0th firm-level 
observation. The weights are calculated as values to be assigned to each 
input and output in order to maximize the efficiency score for each firm, 
and, therefore, can vary from firm to firm. 
DEA can be viewed as an extension of simple ratio analysis. With a 
single output and input, the objective function becomes maximization of a 
single ratio. The reference set is the observation(s) that is maximum on that 
ratio. Efficiency for other observations are calculated by comparing the 
ratio of each observation against the maximum. DEA can also be viewed as 
an extension of total factor productivity constructs. If each unit were 
allowed to select the set of weights, in a total factor productivity computa- 
tion these would be prices; DEA empirically generates weights for each 
firm for its outputs and inputs which help to present that unit in the best 
possible light. This is subject to the condition that the set of weights 
selected does not give any observation an efficiency score of greater than 
unity. An observation that is superior to all others on any single ratio will 
be rated efficient. It will have a score of 1 on a scale of 0 to 1. By assigning 
high weights to the appropriate variables and very low weights to the other 
variables, the procedure emphasizes the ratio of one particular output-in- 
put, among the several other output-input ratios which can be put into a 
DEA model, on which this efficient observation excels. 
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The CCR approach assumes constant returns to scale. Banker, Charnes 
and Cooper [BCC] (1984) also show that overall efficiency can be broken 
up into its technical and scale components, and we use the BCC approach 
which computes the technical efficiency of each observation, given its scale 
of operations, for our empirical analysis, whereby we are able to isolate the 
actual organizational efficiency. To solve the non-linear, non-convex frac- 
tional program denoted in (l), either of two linear programs can be 
formulated. The first one constrains the weighted sum of inputs to unity 
and maximizes the outputs to be attained. This is the output-augmentation 
model and we use such a formulation to calculate the revenue maximizing 
frontier for the 200 firm-level observations in our data set. The objective 
unction is to maximize output given the quantities of various inputs to 
hand. If an observation is inefficient, then the procedure identifies how 
much quantities of each output can be proportionally expanded by that 
firm so as to be similar to similar efficient firms using similar quantities of 
inputs. (Recollect that we have five time-windows over which we evaluate 
the performance of 40 firms.) This formulation yields performance scores 
for each firm relative to its own performance over time, and to the 
performance of other firms in the same and other time periods. We call 
this score the revenue maximization score. The following are used as 
outputs and inputs. For the first formulation, which we call for convenience 
the revenue maximization score (REV MAX), we use three outputs (v = 3), 
which are (1) total local revenues, (2) total toll revenues, and (3) total 
access and other revenues, and three inputs (s = 3), which are (1) total 
number of switches, (2) the total number of access lines, and (3) the total 
number of employees. The revenue figures are deflated to 1973 using the 
consumer price index for telephone services obtained from the Statistical 
Abstract of the United States published by the Bureau of the Census. Data 
on the various outputs and inputs are obtained from the annual Federal 
Communications Commission publication titled Statistics of Communica- 
tions Common Carriers. 
A second formulation can then be written, which constrains the sum of 
the weighted outputs at unity and minimizes the inputs needed. This is 
called the input conservation formulation, We use such a formulation to 
calculate a cost minimizing frontier for the firms and call the results 
obtained the cost minimizing score (COST MIN) for the firms. The outputs 
(r = 2), used for each firm are: (1) total number of local calls, and (2) total 
number of toll calls; the inputs (s = 3) used are: (1) maintenance and 
depreciation expenses, (2) traffic, commercial and general office expenses, 
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and (3) other expenses. Maintenance and depreciation expenses are de- 
flated using the producer price index for capital equipment and traffic, 
commercial, general office and other expenses are deflated using the 
producer price index for intermediate goods, both obtained from the 
Statistical Abstract. While the total number of toll and local calls is very 
highly correlated with minutes of toll and local usage, the unavailability of 
minutes data prior to 3980 precluded their usage as output variables. 
DEA is a methodolo~ directed to frontiers rather than to central 
tendencies and it is particularly useful in uncovering relationships not 
uncovered by other methods of estimation (Seiford and Thrall, 19901. The 
advantage of the DEA lies in its approach. DEA optimizes for each 
individual firm, in place of overall aggregates and the single optimization 
normally performed in statistical regressions. Instead of trying to fit a 
regression plane through the center of the data, DEA floats a piece-wise 
linear surface to rest on top of observations, and it is driven by the data 
rather than by restrictive assumptions as to the nature of the technology or 
functional form. 
We have highlighted that these are the major models, and different 
results can be obtained from different models. The CCR model assumes 
constant returns to scale while the BCC model assumes variable returns to 
scale. In other words, the BCC model calculates a technical efficiency score 
at the given scale of operations. Whether returns to scale characteristics 
display increasing, constant or decreasing patterns is a subsequent issue, 
and the BCC model isolates pure technical efficiency from the confounding 
effects of scale efficiency, while the CCR model yields a score of total 
efficiency which is a composite of technical and scale efficiency. Within the 
BCC and CCR models there can be an output-augmentation orientation or 
an input-conservation orientation. These orientations capture different 
facets of behavioral and psychological objectives present within firms. 
4. Analysis of results 
While individual scores capturing the revenue ma~mization and cost 
minimization abilities of each firm have been calculated, discussion of the 
theoretical implication of the results are based on the average values of 
these scores for the 40 firms in the sample, by each time-period, and then 
the pattern of scores of the Bell (ex-Bell from 1984 and belonging to the 
various RHC’s thereafter) versus the non-Bell operating companies are 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics for revenue maximization score 
Years 
1973 1978 1981 1984 1987 
Mean (all companies, N = 40) 
Median 
Mean (Bell Companies, N = 22) 




# of frontier defining firms 
# of frontier defining firms to total 
0.5584 0.7583 0.9118 0.9006 0.9141 
0.5225 0.7749 0.9547 0.9359 0.9519 
0.5843 0.7841 0.9371 0.8762 0.9435 
0.5708 0.7268 0.8811 0.9303 0.8782 
0.1491 0.1023 0.1028 0.1004 0.0941 
0.3844 0.5720 0.6047 0.6438 0.7065 
1.0000 1 .oooo 1 .oooo 1.0000 1 .oooo 
3 1 10 14 16 
7.5% 2.5% 25% 35% 40% 
compared. Descriptive statistics of the two sets of scores are given in 
Tables 1 and 2. 
We undertake a detailed analysis of the trends in the two different 
measures of revenue maximization that we have computed. From reviewing 
Table 1 we note that the rise in the revenue maximization score, from 
0.5584 in 1973 to 0.9141 in 1987 is significant. Recollect that a score of 1 
denotes a firm’s ability to extract maximum possible outputs, given inputs. 
That the average score for 1987 is greater than 0.9 shows that firms are 
able to extract a very large proportion of obtainable revenues with their 
given resources, relative to 1973 when the average scores were around the 
0.5 mark. The industry sector as a whole may not be behaving optimally in 
realizing all potential revenues with assets, but psychological changes 
within firms seem apparent as it has certainly moved towards that opti- 
mum. 
Table 2 gives a breakdown of the Wilcoxon (1945) test results carried out 
on the REV MAX score, as it is compared from one period to the next. 
Statistically, the REV MAX score for 1973 and 1978 are significantly 
lower than those for the succeeding periods (all p values are < 0.0001). 
However, the scores for 1981, 1984 and 1987 are very similar, and are not 
statistically different from one another. This indicates that between the 
periods 1973 to 1978, and from 1978 to 1981, firms were striving hard to 
reach the optimal frontier that would define their revenue maximization 
ability. However, by 1981 they were very near that frontier, and while 
further improvements toward an optimum score would be statistically 
significant, it seems that there has been a peaking. Also of interest is that 
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Table 2 
Wilcoxon test statistics and results: Pair-wise comparison of mean revenue maximization score between 
years a 





5.219 5.359 5.359 5.373 Test statistic 
< 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 p value 
5.442 5.121 5.390 Test statistic 
< 0.0001 < O.oool < 0.0001 p value 
- 0.992 - 0.598 Test statistic 
0.3214 0.5496 p value 
0.654 Test statistic 
0.5128 p value 
a The test carried out is to evaluate the hypothesis that the score for the year in the row is less than the 
score for the year in the column. 
there has been a slight but non-significant decline in the score between 
1981 and 1984, but there was an improvement between 1984 and 1987. 
Table 3 reveals that the average cost minimization score has risen 
steadily between 1973 and 1987. 
From Table 3 it is observed that the average cost minimization scores for 
the firms range from 0.6644 in 1973 to 0.8678 in 1987, and the rise is steady 
and monotonic. This indicates that while firms are not at an optimal 
position with respect to producing outputs with the technically lowest 
feasible costs, they are clearly increasing their x-efficiencies in minimizing 
levels of costs and improving the utilization of their operating resources. A 
statistical comparison of the average cost minimization scores between 
years follows in Table 4. 
Table 3 
Descriptive statistics for the cost minimization score 
Years 
1973 1978 1981 1984 1987 
Mean score 
Median score 
Mean (Bell companies) 




# of frontier defining firms 
% of frontier firms to total 
0.6644 0.7488 0.7654 0.8237 0.8678 
0.6175 0.7293 0.7789 0.8494 0.8873 
0.5813 0.6992 0.7194 0.8759 0.8733 
0.7658 0.8096 0.8210 0.7599 0.8610 
0.1702 0.1299 0.1189 0.1409 0.1315 
0.4505 0.5099 0.4432 0.5124 0.5755 
1 .OQoo 1 .oooo 1 .oooo 1.0000 1.0000 
3 3 3 5 10 
7.5% 7.5% 7.5% 12.5% 25% 
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Table 4 
Wilcoxon test statistics and results: Pair-wise comparison of mean cost minimization scores between 
years a 
Years 1978 1981 1984 1987 Items 
1973 4.300 4.082 3.844 4.591 
< 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 
1978 2.371 2.903 4.271 
0.0177 0.0037 < 0.0001 
1981 2.608 4.256 











a The test carried out is to evaluate the hypothesis that the score for the year in the row is less than the 
score for the year in the column. 
The monotonically rising trend in cost minimization between the periods 
1973, 1978, 1981, 1984 and 1987 is also statistically validated. From Table 4 
we note that the scores for each period are significantly lower (all p values 
are < 0.05) than those for the succeeding periods. However, unlike in the 
case of the revenue maximization score, closeness to an optimal score is not 
reached in 1987, let alone in 1981. Hence, there is potential for future 
productivity gains, as competition intensifies and firms have no recourse 
but to increase cost-efficiency scores in order to sustain themselves against 
falling profits. Nevertheless, the fact that the firms are continuously striving 
to move towards an optimum, and be efficient in resource utilization, is 
further borne out when we read Table 4 across the diagonal; from Table 4 
it is seen that increases in the average score between all pairs of periods 
(1973 to 1978; 1978 to 1981; 1981 to 1984; and 1984 to 19871 are significant 
(all with p values < 0.051, albeit some pairs of years more so than others. 
We have postulated earlier as to why we expect revenue maximization 
scores to differ significantly from cost minimization scores in each period. 
While the theoretical framework articulates the view that with the onset of 
a competitive environment, both the revenue maximization and cost mini- 
mization abilities will increase equally as the complex motivational schema 
within firms are altered, often the existing reward systems within firms 
motivate more revenue-enhancing rather than cost-cutting behavior. We do 
find distinct patterns of differences between the averages of both the 
revenue maximizing and the cost minimizing scores; thus our rationale 
seems justified by the evidence to hand. These results are given in Table 5, 
which contains a year-by-year comparison of the revenue maximization 
score (REV MAX) and the cost minimization score (COST MIN). 
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Table 5 
Wilcoxon test statistics and results: Test of differences between the revenue maximization score and the 
cost minimization score for different Years ’ 
Year Mean revenue Mean cost Test p value 
maximization minimization statistic 
score score 
1973 0.5584 0.6644 -2.819 0.0048 
1978 0.7583 0.7488 0.538 0.5908 
1981 0.9118 0.7654 3.983 < 0.0001 
1984 0.9006 0.8237 2.139 0.0324 
1987 0.9141 0.8678 1.380 0.1675 
a The test evaluates the hypothesis that the mean revenue maximization score is greater than the mean 
cost minimization score for each year. 
From Table 5 we note that the average revenue maximization score for 
1973 is significantly lower than the cost minimization score (p < 0.05). 
However, as firms place more emphasis on augmenting their revenue 
generating capabilities such a pattern alters. By 1981 the average revenue 
maximization score has become significantly greater than the average cost 
minimization score. Such a trend continues for 1984 as well, but by 1987 
the revenue maximization score has already reached a plateau, and the 
increase in the cost minimization score by that period means that the 
differences in scores in 1987 are not as large. However, we stress that our 
evidence is only indirect and the issue is empirical. More micro-evidence as 
to whether the reward structures of firms either encourage revenue-en- 
hancing or cost-minimizing behavior is warranted. It is also feasible that 
internal rent-seeking creates x-inefficiencies at the level of the firm. Never- 
theless, there can be a difference between personal rent-seeking which 
leads to x-inefficiency, and revenue-maximizing behavior which leads to 
maximizing one’s own visibility along with firm performance. As long as 
personal behavior does not lead to a diversion of resources away from 
firm-level activities, that is individual behavior is goal congruent with that 
of the firm, firm-level performance outcomes will be maximized. 
5. Comparison of performance arising from differences in ownership struc- 
tures 
So far our discussion has been focused on the average performance of 
the 40 key firms that make up the industry. However, one advantage of the 
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Table 6 
Mann-Whitney test results of whether the various performance scores are greater for the Bell 
companies than for the non-Bell companies in each time period 
Time periods 
1973 1978 1981 1984 1987 
Reuenue maximization score 
Mean: 
Bell companies 0.5483 
Non-Bell companies 0.5708 
Test statistic 0.7476 
p value 0.5457 
Cost minimization score 
Mean: 
Bell companies 0.5813 
Non-Bell companies 0.7658 
Test statistic - 3.0449 
p value 0.0023 
0.7841 0.9371 0.8762 0.9435 
0.7268 0.8811 0.9303 0.8782 
2.1749 2.0798 - 1.6719 1.9303 
0.0296 0.0375 0.0945 0.0536 
0.6992 0.7194 0.8759 0.8733 
0.8096 0.8210 0.7599 0.8610 
- 2.4059 - 2.6780 2.3244 0.1359 
0.0160 0.0074 0.0201 0.8919 
DEA method is that we can obtain scores for individual firms and for 
groups of firms. This makes micro-micro comparison much easier. Owner- 
ship patterns significantly impact on firm-level behavior and performance, 
since the nature of incentive systems in place may differ widely. Also, in 
Tables 1 and, 3 the means of the various scores are computed for the whole 
sample, and separately for the Bell and non-Bell sub-groups. Recollect that 
in our panel of firms 22 of the firms were, prior to the 1984 divestiture, 
part of the AT&T family. Since 1984 they are part of the families of the 
seven regional holding companies. For convenience we refer to these firms 
as Bell companies for all the time-periods. There are 18 other independent 
companies in our sample. These have not been as much in the limelight as 
the Bell companies. However, they are not an insubstantial part of the 
industry mosaic. Table 6 gives the results of the Mann-Whitney (1947) test 
of the hypothesis that the means of each of the performance scores, for 
each period, is greater for the Bell companies than for the non-Bell 
operating companies. 
The test we undertake is predicated by the notion that ownership 
differences can also cause significant variations in performance. In fact, the 
earliest empirical study on x-efficiency by Shelton (1967) established pre- 
cisely the fact that differential incentives altered the psychological make-up 
of employees in franchised versus managed organizations. In the U.S. 
telecommunications industry, the Bell operating companies belonged to 
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AT&T. AT&T became a dominant monopoly in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries to exploit networking economies and provide 
universal service. Given legal monopoly rights, a significant part of its 
business risk was eliminated. Consequently, the environment AT&T and 
its constituent firms operated in was secure. While it provided services over 
only 40 percent of the U.S. land area, these were the most lucrative 
territories. Other independent firms operated in 60 percent of the U.S. 
land area, but in non-lucrative territories. Their survival and profitability 
was more difficult, not least also because they needed inter-connection 
services from the AT&T-owned Bell Operating Companies. Since 1984 
Bell Operating Companies have had a large part of their monopoly-rights 
taken away, and their operations are under far greater scrutiny. There has 
been a major transformation in their environments, with inconsistent 
changes in intra-firm psychological dimensions which are very strong. 
The results, as can be observed, are very interesting. The average 
revenue maximization score for the Bell companies was higher in the 
period 1978 to 1981. As explained, they have historically had the prime 
urban locations as their franchises, and have exploited their erstwhile 
monopoly positions in these. Conversely, in the period to the end of 1981, 
that is for the years 1973, 1978 and 1981, the average cost minimization 
scores for the non-Bell companies were significantly higher compared to 
the Bell companies. What does this evidence imply? It seems that the Bell 
companies, which had relatively greater monopoly power, used such factors 
to their advantage in being more aggressive in revenue capture as opportu- 
nities opened from 1978. At the same time they displayed the classic 
symptoms of monopoly in that they were less efficient than their counter- 
part (non-Bell) firms who did not have the AT&T monopoly privileges and 
had to struggle more to ensure acceptable performance. 
However, following the divestiture of 1984, the data reveal interesting 
dynamics at work. With divestiture the Bell companies were reconstituted 
into seven regional operating company groups. However, the other inde- 
pendents still retained their existing structures, carrying with them the 
burden of history and path-dependencies, and did not face the same 
“divestiture shock” as the Bell companies. A comparison of the different 
scores for 1981 and 1987 reveals the following trends. From reviewing the 
revenue maximization score we note that the Bell companies seemed to be 
losing their strong edge in being more x-efficient than the non-Bell compa- 
nies in revenue maximization, perhaps as a result of implementing the 1984 
divestiture order, but have subsequently caught up. 
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Where, however, the cost minimization score is concerned the story is 
different; the Bell companies have certainly now caught up. Not only are 
they no longer more inefficient than the non-Bells, they are indeed equal 
or better performers. Reviewing Table 6, we note that in 1984 the Bell 
companies’ average cost minimization scores are on average significantly 
greater than those for the non-Bells, while in the following period, 1987, 
they are higher than that of the non-Bell companies, though not signifi- 
cantly so. It is possible that the major strategic change brought about by the 
1984 divestiture enabled the Bell companies to “wipe the slate clean” and 
start with fresh behavioral predilections. Conversely, the non-Bell indepen- 
dents still seem to be caught up with history and path dependencies. 
Hence, the display of relatively unremarkable patterns of improvement in 
their performance when compared to the Bell companies. 
6. Summary 
We have demonstrated a psychology-based framework that is useful in 
explaining dynamic performance changes of firms that occur as a result of 
market liberalization. The underlying postulates of x-efficiency theory 
provide a useful anchor in this endeavor. We illustrate the framework with 
reference to firms in the U.S. telecommunications industry. A brief sum- 
mary of our results yields the information that in the period 1973 to 1987 
firms in the telecommunications industry have significantly improved their 
relative micro-micro performance. X-efficiencies seem to have been re- 
leased by market liberalization, and these have led to both revenue 
augmentation and input conservation over the fifteen-year period that we 
study; we do, however, find a greater consistency over time in the pattern 
of improvement in the cost minimization score. Thus there may be several 
other forces at play which can have a major impact on scores, and a 
decomposition of these scores via regression analysis may reveal the influ- 
ence of many factors. These factors are translated into operational out- 
comes through various actions within firms, such as changing reporting 
relationships, technology adoption and rationalization of activities which 
make work easier. 
DEA enables us to identify how each firm fares relative to the other 
members of its cohort, and for conducting detailed micro-micro analysis 
such information can aid decision-makers in drawing inferences about the 
output augmentation or resource conservation strategies that need to be 
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undertaken if firms want to attain a position on the frontier. Because we 
have postulated that with emerging liberalization of their environments 
firms will improve their performance as a result of changing behavioral 
factors within firms, it is necessary to have measures of relative perfor- 
mance between non-liberalized and liberalized periods. Such measures 
should be able to factor in empirically the impact of such changing firm 
level behavior within firms. The use of DEA enables such measures to be 
developed, and, consequently, the precise impact of public or business 
policies on the direction of performance outcomes of firms can be assessed. 
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